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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STEVEN LYNN KAYf dba GARY APARTMENTS
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-'•-•

v.

JOSEPH BRENT WOOD
Respondent and Defendant,

'

:

Case No. 14197

v,
STEVEN LYNN KAY, et al, and
GARY APARTMENT CORPORATION,
Third-Party Defendants and
Appellants

.

BREIF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an appeal from a Judgment by the lower court
in favor of the respondent (purchaser) and against the
appellants (sellers) with regard to a liquidated damages
provision under a Uniform Real Estate Contract.

The court

would not allow a total forfeiture as it would be
considered unconscionable.

PROCEEDINGS AND
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT
The case was tried without a jury on June 28 and July
13, 1973/ (R.26) (not on January 17, 1975, as appellant asser
in his brief, page 1).

The court entered a Memorandum

Decision on October 3, 1973, (R.26) ruling that respondent
had defaulted in failing to pay the balance due under
the contract; dismissed respondent's counterclaim for decision
for fraudulant misrepresentation; and further found that
"to enforce the forfeiture provisions of the contract would
be unconscionable and the amount of such forfeiture would
far exceed any loss to plaintiff that the parties may
have contemplated."

(R.27)

The court stated that the

plaintiff would be entitled to a judgment in the amount of
$26,648.30 and ordered the case reopened for the purpose of
taking additional testimony as to what, if any, offsets
plaintiff was entitled to as actual damages.

(R.27)

On December 5, 1974, using the Perkins v. Spencer, 121
Utah 468,242 P2d 445 formula, the court held a hearing to
determine what offsets, if any, plaintiff was entitled to
for:

Loss of bargain; Reasonable rental value, 14 months;

Commission, if any, on sale; Damage or depreciation to
property; and Decline in value, if any, of property.

(R.27)

Pursuant to that hearing, on January 17, 1975, the court
entered new findings (R 13-17, 49-50).
-2-

The court set forth

the payments made by respondent and the offsets the court
felt by law were allowable to appellant.

The court then

concluded that to enforce the forfeiture provisions of the
contract would not be unconscionable (R.16).

Respondent

concluded that the court's latest findings did not consider
all of the amounts paid by respondent and moved the court
for a new trial and for new Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law.

The court took the motion under advisement and on

June 26, 1975, signed Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law which is the subject of appeal (R.19-23).
The court returned to its original decision that "To enforce
the forfeiture provisions of the contract would be
unconscionable..." (R.32).

The court entered judgment for

respondent against appellants in the sum of $4,663.05 (R.34).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

:

-

Respondent seeks to have this court sustain the lower
court's finding that the forfeiture provisions of the
contract should not be enforced.

Respondent further seeks

on its cross-appeal that it be found that the court erred
as a matter of law and equity in not granting a judgment
to respondent for all moneys paid to appellant in cash or
by improvements to the property above actual damages.

•

'

• " • • •

•

- • • ;

•

-

,

v

-

,

.
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-
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STATEMENT OP FACTS
On or about July 10, 1971, appellant and respondent
entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract for the purchase
of two eight-plex apartments used for student rentals at
Snow College located at Ephriam, Utah.

(The Contract at

R.109-112 is the final contract actually signed).

Respondent

was to purchase appellant's equity in the property by
paying twelve thousand dollars in two equal payments of six
thousand dollars each.

The property also had a mortgage

balance which respondent was to retire.

The respondent

alleged that he purchased the property on appellant's
representation that the cash flow from the rentals would
carry the expenses of operation, including servicing the
debt to Zion's Bank.

Appellant, Kay, admitted the

representations but claimed they were expressly restricted
to the "school year."

(The real estate listing represented

gross income double the amount actually grossed by
appellant (sellers).) (Pltf's Exhibit No. 2 ) .
Respondent paid the appellant, Kay, $6,000.00 of the
$12,000.00 equity in July of 1971 when possession was
delivered to respondent.

Pursuant to the contract terms

(Paragraph (f) at R.112) respondent immediately commenced
to upgrade the buildings and by September of 1971 made
$5,802.30 dollars worth of permanent improvements to the
-4-
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The matter was tried with the results fully described
under the heading DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT, page 2 of
this brief.
J

" " ARGUMENT
POINT I

^

:

THE COURT'S DECISION THAT TO ENFORCE THE FORFEITURE
PROVISIONS OF THE CONTRACT WOULD BE UNCONSCIONABLE IS
SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS OF THE CASE.
The law, as to the enforcability of forfeiture clauses
in Uniform Real Estate Contracts and other contracts, is
well developed in the Utah Case Law.

The Utah Supreme

Court has been a leader in protecting the rights of a
defaulting but otherwise blameless purchaser.

Utah's early

case of Malmberg v. Baugh 62 Utah 331, 218 P. 975 (1923)
has been praised as one of the best on this subject, and
has been favorably cited by many courts and writers.

(See

"Forfeitures Under Real Estate Installment Contracts in
Utah," by Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, 3 Utah Law Review 30.)

:

In the case of Freedmon v. Rector of St. Mathias Parish
230 P. 2d 629 (Cal. 1951) Justice Traynor of the California
Supreme Court cited Malmberg v. Baugh as he concluded that
the forfeiture clause "cannot be enforced as a valid clause
providing for liquidated damages."
same opinion, went on to state:
-6-

Judge Traynor, in the

Such .•.:naitiias ; ;n.uk: reasonably be jusLirievi
as punishment for one who willfully breaches
his contract...If a penalty were t^ be imposed,
it should bear some rational relationship to
its purpose, A penalty equal to the net benefits
conferred by part performance bears no sue:
relationship. It not only fails to take :n~ .
consideration the degree of culpability, but,
its severity increases as the seriousness of
the breach decreases. Thus, a vendee who
breaches his contract before he has benef i~ N* i
the vendor by part performance suffers no
penalty, whereas one who has almoLt completely
performed his contract suffers the maximum
penaip-v. Freedman v. Rector of St. Mathias
Parish", :V? ~. 2* ^?Q fCal. 1951)"""
Most V:\\>rican ,:ourf.s >••/. . . :.-: \ '.•*. . .• ; y enforce a
liquidale-i d..images clause where there is no actual danuujej.
Courts are, and should be, i -luetant to enforce a forfeiture
cliune aqalnst a patty who has good cause, l:nt perhaps not
i leqai oxruso, Ini* nonperformance.
4
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is not a > >/i lf/ui default,

(See Restatement of Contracts;

12 Willis ton/ Contracts Se , •, 14 7 (\ ( 1 • 17 o) , 5
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Corbin, Contracts Sec. 1123 (1964) and FreediMh v. Rector
supra) .

.

•

•

v?

"

Courts have and should employ nonenforcement of a
forfeiture clause as an equitable compromise and a
corrective device in situations like the instant case.
Awarding liquidated damages that a court believes to be
in excess of actual damages violates the compensation
principle.

In many cases, including the one at bar,

forfeiture would be punitive in nature and would violate
the compensation principle.

This principle seeks to give .

the plaintiff what the defendant's breach has cost him and
not put the plaintiff in a better position than he would
have been in had there been proper performance.
The compensation principle was reiterated in Young
v. Hansen 218 P. 2d 666 (1950) when Judge Wolfe stated:
Where a written contract for the sale of real
estate contains a provision for forfeiture or
a provision that installment may be retained
by the seller as liquidated damages, the courts '*
determine whether the amounts received by the
seller are greatly in excess of the fair
rental value and any extra ordinary wear and
tear and if so, treat it as a penalty and
require remission. This is a device to do
equity. [Emphasis added]
This compensation rule has been stated most succinctly
and clearly in the case of Perkins v. Spencer supra'.
-8-
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[Emphasis added]
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contract.

No effort was made by the parties to estimate the actual
damages that might have been suffered by the appellant in
the event of respondent's breach.

On the state of the

record, the trial judge quite reasonably concluded that ;
the stipulated damage

r

was arbitrarily arrived at by the

preprinted contract and was not intended to represent damages.
It is undisputed by the appellant that he received
$6,-000.00 cash when the contract was executed, that the sum
of $5,802.30 was expended for permanent improvements on the
building (per Paragraph (F) R.112), and that thirteen monthly
mortgage payments, totaling $14,846.00 were paid, causing
a net principal reduction of $4,663.05 (Appl. Brief p. 2).
Appellants,received a direct total cash benefit from respondeni
performance in the minimum amount of $16,465.35.

In determinii

then, whether to enforce the forfeiture provisions of the
contract, the court must and did compare the damages
actually sustained by appellants with the stipulated amount.
The uncontroverted facts of this case are that the appellants
sustained no actual damages.

While the court, in this

case, reopened the trial for the specific purpose of
allowing the appellant to put on any testimony of actual
damage not covered at the trial, no evidence of damage
was ever presented.

A search of the record on appeal will

not show any claim to any allowable damages. A search of
-10-

appellant's brief will find no actual damages claimed.
The lower court properly concluded that the stipulated
damages were sufficiently disproportionate to the damages
actually sustained to allow a total forfeiture of amounts
paid.
While it is true that the courts may not want to
interfere with the ability of people to freely contract
one with another, the court is obligated to guard against
unjust enrichment and unconscionable forfeitures.

In the

instant case, the court did not automatically disturb the
contract between the parties.

The respondent specifically

plead the theory of unjust enrichment as follows:

"To allow

a forfeiture would be to unjustly enrich the plaintiff and
to provide damages in excess of the actual damages and
thereby punish the defendant contrary to law."

(R.87)

On the trial of this matter, the plaintiff put on no
evidence of any actual damages sustained as a result of
the breach.

Months later the court reopened the case

for the specific purpose of allowing the plaintiff to
show any offsets or damages that it might have sustained
by reason of defendant1s breach.

No evidence of any

damages were presented.
Respondent, by way of interrogatories, attempted to
ascertain any damages which appellant suffered as a result
-11-

of respondent's breach.

(R.96-98)

The appellant objected

to most of the interrogatories, stating that they were not
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
law suit.

(R.95)

Both respondent and the court have given

the appellant ample and every opportunity to come forth
with any showing of an actual monetary damage occurring
to appellant as a result of respondent's breach.
damages have ever been shown.

No

To automatically enforce

the forfeiture provisions in the instant case would allow
damages grossly in excess of any damages realized and could
only result in a total unjust enrichment for appellant.
Appellant seems to take solace from the fact that
the respondent is an attorney at law and therefore
understood the forfeiture clause contained in the contract.
No such solace may be found, however, since the profession
of the purchaser is irrelevant.

An attorney is as

entitled to equity as any ordinary purchaser.

As this

court recently stated in Williamson v. Wanless,
2d

,

P2d

Utah

, (1976 Supreme Court No. 14076) :

"The principles of equity and justice are universal; they
apply wherever appropriate and necessary to enforce rights
or to prevent oppression and injustices."
cited therein.)

-12-

(See also cases

>

Justice Worthen did not exempt attorney purchasers

when he stated the following in Cole v. Parker

300 P. 2d

623,627:
I am in general agreement with the doctrine
that equity should give protection to a
defaulting purchaser whose default is neither
wilful nor deliberate against a grasping vendor
who is waiting to spring the moment the
vendee defaults in the slightest manner, and
who seeks not the purchase money due him
but the property sold plus enormous amounts
in addition. ;, ,.••...
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW AND EQUITY IN ALLOWING
APPELLANTS IMPROPER CREDITS AS AN OFFSET TO THE MONEYS
PAID TO APPELLANT BY RESPONDENT,

-

,

The court, by its memorandum decision, dated October
3, 1973, found that it would be unconscionable to enforce
the forfeiture provision of the Uniform Real Estate
Contract between the partieshereto, as "the amount of
such forfeiture would far exceed any loss to the plaintiff
that the parties may have contemplated."

(R.27)

The

court further found that the defendant would be entitled
to an accounting with plaintiff and a judgment against
appellant for the difference between the amounts respondent
paid on the contract plus improvements less any offsets
that the plaintiff might be entitled to.
-13-

(R.27)

The court

further found that the respondent had paid sums of money
that benefited appellant as follows (R.27):
Down payment

$ 6,000.00

Thirteen monthly mortgage
payments

14,846.00

Permanent improvements

5, 802.30

TOTAL

$26,648.30

The court further in its memorandum decision followed
the Perkins v. Spencer (supra) doctrine and formula and
ordered the matter reopened for taking of additional
testimony as to what, if any, offset plaintiff was entitled
to according to a formula used by the court:
Loss of bargain

$

Reasonable rental value,
fourteen months

$

Commission, if any, on sale . . . $
Damage or depreciation to
property

$

Decline in value, if any,
of property

$

TOTAL

$

The lower court easily disposed of several of the credit;
due the seller.

First, it was stipulated at the rehearing

that the plaintiff had not paid any commission on the sale
of the property to respondent, thus excluding that item as
a possible credit or damage to the appellant.
-14-

Appellant

objected to any written interrogatories or questions at
trial as to the resale of the property after the appellant's
retaking thereof.

The court sustained those objections

so there is no evidence of resale of the property or of
any commission being paid on the resale of the property.
No offset was allowed for decline in market value.
The only evidence as to the fair market value of the
property, at the time of retaking, was the testimony of
an expert real estate appraiser.

The appraiser made an

appraisal of the property within a week of the retaking
for Zions First National Bank.

The appraised value of

the property was $132,000.00, or $7,000.00 more than the
contract price between the parties.

The court made a

specific finding that the property had, in fact, increased
in value during the year of respondent's occupancy some
$7,000.00 (R.21, Para. 9,14)

Under these facts, the

appellant would be entitled to no offset or credit for
decline in market value.
No offset should be allowed in the instant case for
damage or depreciation to the property.

No damage to the

property was alleged or claimed by appellant.

Depreciation

to the property was claimed by appellant, but the claim was
based on book or tax schedule depreciation and not actual
-15-

depreciation.

Only actual depreciation is a proper offset.

The Utah Supreme Court has explained what is meant by damage
to or depreciation of property in Perkins v. Spencer.
This court stated that any damage to or depreciation of the
property sustained during the buyer's period of occupancy
will be reflected in a decline of the market values of the
property.
value.

Only actual depreciation is reflected in market

In the present case, since there was no decline

in the market value of the property, there could not have
been any damage to or depreciation of the property.

Again

the lower court found that the property had increased in
value some $7,000.00 plus dollars.
The court then considered evidence as to an offset
for the reasonable rental value for the fourteen months
of respondent's occupancy.

The court, in its findings of

fact, found that "the actual income received by the defendant
[respondent] while operating the apartments was the reasonable
rental value of the apartments and the actual expenses incurre
by the defendant [respondent] while he was operating the
property were reasonable expenses."

(R.21, Para. 13)

The

evidence for that period showed that the gross income from
rent receipts was $13,860.00 and that the total expenses
prior to debt service were $6,293.80, making a net income
before debt services of $7,294.96.
-16-

Thus, in order for

respondent to operate the apartments and pay all expenses
and service the debt, respondent was required to subsidize
the apartments $7,551.04.

(Def's Exhibit No. 14)

It is

clear from the foregoing that the maximum credit, if any,
due to the appellant for the reasonable rental value for
the period of occupancy would be the net income before
debt service in the sum of $7,294.96.
If the net rental income (reasonable rental value)
is allowed as an offset, it should be applied to the thirteen
monthly mortgage payments of $14,846.00.

The same mortgage

payments would have been made by appellants had they been
in possession and the net income before debt service would
have been only $7,294.96. Appellants' tax returns clearly
show that, contrary to the real estate listing, they had
substantially subsidized the apartments.

(See Def's

Exhibits 12 and 13). The lower court credited the
respondent with the net principal mortgage reduction in
the amount of $4,663.05.

Thirteen monthly mortgage

payments of $14,846.00 less the reasonable net rental
value of $7,294.96 leaves respondent a balance of $7,551.04
rather than $4,663.05 as found by the court.
The last offset which the plaintiff would be entitled
to under the court's formula was "loss of bargain."
-17-

From

the cases and decisions of the Utah Supreme Court, it is
clear that there could be no damages suffered by the
plaintiff as a loss of bargain.

The Utah Supreme Court

in several cases has held that:
The measure of damages is the difference between
the value of the land at the time of the breach
of the contract, or, as it is sometimes stated,
at the time of the the re-entering of the vendor and
the abandonment of the land by the vendee, and
the contract price agreed to be paid, together
with interest on the purchase price...Dopp v, Richard,
43 Utah 332,135 P. 98.
(See also Malmberg v. Baugh, 218 P. 975, 980; Anderson v.
Hansen, 8 Utah 2d 370, 335 P. 2d 404 (1959); CJS vol. 92
"Vendor and Purchaser," sec, 537, P. 528, which also cites
Perkins v. Spencer.)
For the appellant to have suffered any damage by way
of loss of bargain, the appellant would have to show that:
(1) the contract price was for more than the market value
of the property, or (2) that after retaking and on resale,
appellant received less than the original contract price,
i.e. $125,000.00.

The lower court assumed that the fair

market value at the time of contract was approximately
$125,000.00, and specifically found that the market value
of the property at the time of retaking was $132,000.00.
(R.21 Para. 9)

The court further found that the increased

value resulted principally from the permanent improvements
made by the defendant.

(R.22 Para. 14)
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The respondent attempted by interrogatory and by
cross examination to determine if the appellant had any
loss of bargain by reason of a loss suffered on resale
of the property after retaking same.

(R. 96 Para. 4,19)

The appellant objected to the interrogatory and refused
to answer the same.

(R.95)

The appellant likewise objected

to the question at trial and the court sustained the
objection.

It is apparent from the appellant's objections

that the property apparently had been resold at a price
equal to or greater than the contract price of $125,000.00..
Thus the appellant suffered no loss of bargain.
Both the appellants and the lower court have misinterpreted
or wrongfully applied the concept of "loss of bargain."
The appellants argue that the loss of bargain is the difference
between appellants purchase price and the contract sales
price.

In answer to respondent1s interrogatories

appellants stated the following (R.99):
1.

Do you claim damages due to loss of bargain?

Answer:
2.

Yes

If so, please state:

(a) The amount

of damage you claim is due to loss of bargain;
Answer:

$5,000.00

(b) Set forth in detail how you computed or
calculated the amount.
-19-

Answer:

The sale of the apartments to Wood

was for $125,000.00.

Plaintiff had purchased

the apartments for $120,000.00.

:

If Wood had

continued to pay on the contract as he agreed
to, I would have received $5,000.00.

[Emphasis

added]
Appellant's purchase price is totally immaterial in
determining loss of the bargain.

What if appellants

had paid $100,000.00, $75,000.00, or $50,000.00 for the
property?

Or what if it had been obtained free by

inheritance?

The court is too sufficiently versed on the

meaning of benefit of the bargain for a further r€*cital
here of the law.

It has been clear since Malmberg v. Baugh

and Young v. Hansen.
The lower court construed benefit of the bargain to
mean a contracted or negotiated benefit that flows naturally
from the agreement.

The court's memorandum decision states:

2. The Court finds that the expenditure of
$5,800.00 by defendant and counterclaimant
was done pursuant to a contractual provision
contained at "attachment A (f)fl and that
such improvement was bargained for by plaintiff,
and accounts for the increased market value
of the property in question. [Emphasis added]
(R.28)
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From the above and foregoing modified Findings
of Fact, the Court concludes that the down
payment of $6,000.00 and the increased
market value of the property resulting
principally from the permanent improvements
made by the defendant may be retained by the
plaintiff since to require a return [sic]
these sums to the defendant would deny
plaintiff the benefit of the bargain he
made...
[Emphasis added] (R.29)
The lower court's use of "benefit of the bargain" has no
relationship to damages resulting to a seller from a
buyer's breach.

Under the lower court's theory, any

down payment and any improvements regardless of the dollar
amount or percentage of the total due under the contract
would be forfeited or allowed as an offset.

Under the

correct interpretation of the law-, the seller is to be
compensated for any loss of the benefit of an advantageous
bargain.
Appellants resold the property and apparently at a
price and on terms better than the instant contract for
appellants have refused to divulge the same to the court
or respondent.

Since there was no loss of bargain under

the proper meaning of the offset, respondent is entitled
to a return of the $6,000.00 down payment and $5,802.30
for permanent improvements.
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CONCLUSION
In light of the above, this court is requested to
sustain the lower court's decision that to enforce the forfeiture provisions of the contract would be unconscionable
in the instant case.

Respondent further requests this court

to find that the lower court erred in its finding that
the $6,000.00 down-payment and the $5,802.30 in improvements
should be kept by the plaintiff as a benefit of the bargain.
Respondent requests that this court award a judgment to
defendant in the sum of at least $16,465.85.
Furthermore, respondent requests that he be awarded
his costs incurred herein.
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